








Counter-conducts: A Foucauldian analytics of protest

Dr Carl Death
Department of International Politics
Aberystwyth University
Penglais, Aberystwyth
Wales, SY23 3FE 














Resubmission date: 5 March 2010.


Counter-conducts: A Foucauldian Analytics of Protest

Introduction
	The protests against major international summits in Seattle, Genoa, Prague, Johannesburg, London, Copenhagen and elsewhere over the last decade are claimed to have signalled a ‘return to the streets’ in contemporary global politics (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 12). These protests provide a number of challenges to social movement theory. A particular obstacle to their conceptualization is the continuing dominance of classic binaries of political thought: power and resistance, government and freedom, and dissent and collaboration. These binaries have resulted in a tendency to see social movements as either co-opted or revolutionary. Yet the contours of recent protests, with their jet-set intellectuals, Banksy t-shirts, indigenous activists wielding Sony handycams, solicitors and publicists on quick-dial, private foundation funding and often ambiguous relationship to the state and international institutions, belie such framings. Making sense of the rhizome networks of global governance, power, protest and resistance is one of the primary challenges for contemporary social movement theory (St John, 2008: 184).
	I argue that Foucauldian political thought has more to contribute to these questions, and the study of the relationship between power and protest, than is often imagined. Of course, Michel Foucault has had a profound influence on the study of power, resistance and contentious politics. His influence on a number of theorists of resistance is evident, and the broader influence of concepts like power/knowledge, discourse, and disciplinary and bio-power have set down deep roots in the way in which we think about non-state and adversarial forms of politics (Amoore, 2005; Barry, 2001; Bleiker, 2000). Despite this, the direct influence of Foucault’s work on contemporary social movement studies is more limited than one might expect. This may well stem from the commonly held belief that Foucault had more to say about regimes of power than he did about forms of resistance or alternative politics (Simons, 1995: 82). However the possibility, indeed inevitability, of dissent and resistance are nevertheless at the heart of Foucault’s philosophy, and his relevance for the study of contentious politics can be made far more explicit. 
	To this end, this article elaborates the Foucauldian notion of counter-conducts, described as ‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price’ (Foucault, 2007b: 75). The idea of the counter-conduct was developed by Foucault in the context of his work on governmentality – rationalities or mentalities of government – and captures the close interrelationship between protests and the forms of government they oppose. As such it builds on and develops one of the fundamental Foucauldian insights: that power is relational, rather than being possessed or located (Foucault, 2000a). 
	I argue that the idea of counter-conducts can be used to develop an analytics of protest for the study of contentious politics. Such an approach, drawing closely on Mitchell Dean’s ‘analytics of government’ (1999) – developed for studying regimes of governmentality – has two major strengths. First, it approaches protests and contentious politics not from an actor-centric perspective, but rather orientates itself toward specific practices and rationalities of protests, which themselves work to constitute particular identities and subjectivities through the performance of dissent. Secondly, by destabilizing conventional binaries between power and resistance, government and freedom, an analytics of protest is specifically designed to show how protest and government are mutually constitutive, and thus how forms of resistance have the potential to reinforce and bolster, as well as and at the same time as, undermining and challenging dominant forms of global governance. 
	The following sections briefly contrast existing approaches to the study of resistance and protest with a Foucauldian analytics of protest based on resistance as counter-conduct. This is not intended to replace or refute existing approaches, merely to illuminate an alternative, and perhaps in some ways complementary, approach to the study of protest. Illustrations of such an approach are drawn from the protests that have accompanied major global summits, the ‘Battle of Seattle’ at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999, the Genoa G8 clashes in 2001, the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the London meeting of the G20 and the COP15 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, both in 2009. As a framework, however, this analytics of protest is not limited to the summit form, and can provide a Foucauldian-informed approach to the study of contentious politics and protest in a far broader range of contexts.

Studying social movements, resistance and protest
	Much of the social movement literature has tended to conceptualize resistance as the act of opposing power (Aronowitz and Gautney, 2003; Bond and Desai, 2008; Chatterjee and Finger, 1994; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 1998; Taylor, 1995).  This binary between power and resistance is even more pronounced in the literature on protests. Protests are performative, one-off demonstrations, and are usually seen as merely one form of resistance within larger cycles of contention (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 165; Tarrow, 1998). They are often imagined as standing apart from, and in direct confrontation with, the power they oppose. Even Hardt and Negri, who otherwise have radically critiqued existing notions of power and resistance with their polycentric and diffuse concepts of empire and multitude, still reify this power versus resistance binary when they claim that ‘the magic of Seattle was to show that these many grievances were not just a random, haphazard collection, a cacophony of different voices, but a chorus that spoke in common against the global system’ (2004: 288). 
	The implication often drawn from this assumption of binary opposition is that movements themselves can therefore be categorized as either revolutionaries or collaborators, on the side of either governors or the governed. Doherty and Doyle, for example, make a general and normative ‘distinction between emancipatory environmental groups and governance environmental groups’, the former which challenge dominant cultural codes or social and political values, and the latter which ‘offer no challenge to environmental injustice and are in general reproducing forms of inequality through their participation with governments, financial institutions and transnational corporations in transnational structures of governance’ (2006: 705). This actor-centric approach is a common feature of many existing analyses of protest (c.f. Blühdorn 2006: 26; O’Neill, 2004: 234), which tend to address the origins, motivations, successes and failures of particular groups, often primarily informed by activist testimonies (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998; O’Brien et al, 2000; Tarrow, 1998; Taylor, 1995). Whilst this is a rich and valuable literature, and is essential for understanding movement mobilization and dynamics, taking such groups as starting points unduly narrows the scope of analysis when trying to comprehend contemporary contours of power and government. It is these two dimensions of prevailing approaches to protests – the implied theoretical binary between power and resistance, and the methodological actor-centric approach – that can be supplemented through a Foucauldian perspective on power and resistance.

Foucault on power and resistance
	Foucault’s primary influence on the study of politics has been his re-conceptualization of power – yet his notion of resistance has been regarded as ‘drastically under-theorized’, ‘maddeningly indistinct’, and politically ‘troubling’ (Simons, 1995: 83; Kulynych, 1997: 328; Pickett, 1996: 466). Cohen and Arato argue that, despite the persuasiveness of Foucault’s analysis, he ‘has deprived the modern rebel of any institutional, normative, or personal resources for constituting herself in terms other than those made available by the forces that already control her’ (1994: 294). Sveinung Sandberg states even more directly that, ‘in Foucault, deliberate resistance, struggle and change seem impossible’ (2006: 213).
	Whilst a Foucauldian perspective is certainly politically troubling, his approach to power can provide a basis for a more systematic analysis of protest and resistance. His emphasis on the productive, relational, inescapable nature of power is well-known (Foucault, 1998: 92-97; 2000a), as is his scepticism toward the idea of a pure form of resistance against power. In one of his later essays he reflected that 

I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because if it is not treated with precautions and with certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression (Foucault, 1997: 282)

A Foucauldian perspective is not, therefore, emancipatory; although neither does he argue that resistance is impossible. On the contrary he was very clear that ‘where there is power, there is resistance’ (Foucault, 1998: 95). Indeed, ‘there is no power without potential refusal or revolt’ (Foucault, 2000a: 324). However, rather than social revolution or wars of movement, resistance is identified at the micro-level, ‘in the transgression and contestation of societal norms; in the disruption of metanarratives of humanism; … in the “re-appearance” of “local popular”, “disqualified”, and “subjugated knowledges”; and in the aesthetic of self-creation’ (Kulynych, 1997: 328). ‘Hence there is no single locus of great refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary’ (Foucault, 1998: 96). 
	Such a perspective captures much of the messiness and complexity of contemporary politics far more satisfactorily than an idealized binary between domination and freedom. Recent studies which have drawn on Foucauldian political theory explore, for example, the contradictions and ironies thrown up by video footage of a Seattle ‘anti-globalization’ protestor kicking a Nike sign whilst wearing Nike shoes, and consumer activist campaigners on the steps of Niketown in Seattle assisting the police in the identification and arrest of anarchists (Amoore and Langley, 2004: 106-107). Environmental protests against a nuclear development in South Africa found that, despite contesting the environmental impact assessment through the courts, their engagement was legitimating a process bound up with modernist and developmental power relations (Death, 2006). Graham St John explores the ways in which carnivalesque protests and Global Action Days are simultaneously transgressive, as well as acting as societal ‘safety-valve’ release mechanisms (2008: 168). Whereas many conventional analyses might read these struggles as anomalies or lamentable lapses from pure resistance, from a Foucauldian perspective they reflect the inevitable interrelationship between relations of power and resistance in rhizomatic global politics. Such a verdict is not to praise or condemn this mutual interrelationship, but merely to observe that is an inevitable implication of Foucault’s stance on power.
	This tight interrelationship between power and freedom is captured by the concept of governmentality. Governmental forms of power are attempts to regulate the ‘conduct of conduct’ and ensure ‘the right disposition of things’ going far beyond an equation of power with the state or formal institutions (Foucault, 2007a: 87-110; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001; Miller and Rose, 2008). The conduct of conduct covers the shaping or guiding of possible actions and norms by a diverse range of actors and institutions; and in advanced liberal societies these include political parties, schools, prisons, hospitals, charities, NGOs, local community groups and many others. As such the distinction between governmental and non-governmental actors holds little analytical value: actors on both sides of this purported divide are implicated in networks of governmentality and the conduct of conduct ‘at a distance’ (Rose, 1999: 49). Freedom is therefore not in opposition to modern government, but is rather an essential technique, or product, of power. The free citizen and the free market, for example, are cornerstones of modern techniques of rule. By extension, resistance, commonly seen as an assertion of freedom, is itself bound up within networks of governmentality; and liberal democracy’s toleration of dissent and protest within certain limits works, paradoxically, to reinforce as well as challenge dominant power relations. As Jessica Kulynych notes, ‘yearly Washington marches, for example, may actually diffuse discontent by providing a legitimate outlet for protest; at the same time they verify system legitimacy by focusing protest toward the formal legal structures of government’ (1997: 342; see also St John, 2008: 168). Thus there is no grand refusal, only dispersed and shifting points of resistance, or forms of counter-conduct.

Counter-conducts
The mutual interdependence of power, freedom and resistance are therefore at the heart of a governmentality approach. Yet the broader governmentality literature has made little contribution to the study of social movements, protests, and contentious politics. O’Malley et al note that such studies have been seemingly reluctant to address ‘contestations, resistances and social antagonisms’, and that resistance only appears as a failure, or obstacle to government (1997: 510; see also Barry, 2001: 6). Indeed in the key governmentality texts there is very little space given to social movements, dissent and protest (e.g. Barry et al, 1996; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001; Miller and Rose, 2008). Nikolas Rose is typical here, since whilst he aims to ‘strengthen the resources available to those who, because of their constitution as subjects of government, have the right to contest the practices that govern them in the name of their freedom’ (1999: 60), an explicit focus on the ‘minor politics’ of resistance and contestation is left until his conclusion where he discusses alternatives and resistance ‘beyond government’ (ibid: 281). The work of Andrew Barry goes much further, especially in Political Machines where the penultimate chapter discusses ‘the materiality of political conflict’ (2001: 176) through UK anti-roads protestors in the 1990s. He shows how protestors sought to politicize ostensibly a-political sites, through their campaigns for media visibility ‘not at the centre of public administration but at the place where others are seeking to act or which others own or control’ (ibid: 182). By building on Barry’s work, linking it more directly to a governmentality framework of analysis, and drawing upon the recent publication in English of Foucault’s lecture courses, the relatively scant attention to protest and resistance within the governmentality literature can be redressed.
In the series Security, Territory, Population, delivered at the Collège de France in 1978, Foucault discussed how we might describe resistance to processes of governmentality, as distinct from revolts against political sovereignty or economic exploitation. In the context of discussing the early Christian pastorate, he observes that ‘if the objective of the pastorate is men’s conduct, I think equally specific movements of resistance and insubordination appeared in correlation with this that could be called specific revolts of conduct’ (2007a: 194). He also discusses military desertion, Freemasonry, and medical dissenters as political rather than religious forms of counter-conduct: the appeal ‘to be led differently, by other men, and towards other objectives than those proposed by the apparent and official and visible governmentality of society’ (ibid: 198-200). The terminology used to describe these forms of action is dwelt on by Foucault, and he eventually rejects terming them revolts as too precise and too strong; moreover, ‘disobedience’, ‘insubordination’, and ‘dissidence’ are also considered and rejected (ibid: 200). He settles on the term ‘counter-conduct’ [French: contre-conduite]; namely, a ‘struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others’ (ibid: 201). He later clarified that 

I do not mean by that that governmentalization would be opposed by a kind of face-off by the opposite affirmation, ‘we do not want to be governed and we do not want to be governed at all’. I mean that, in this great preoccupation about the way to govern and the search for the ways to govern, we identify a perpetual question which would be: ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them’ (Foucault, 2007b: 44).

This is ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’ (ibid: 45), or ‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price’ (ibid: 75), rather than a complete or total rejection of government. Returning to the example of the counter-conducts against early forms of pastoral Christianity, Foucault notes how these protests or forms of resistance did not use completely foreign strategies, but mobilized ‘border-elements’ which had nevertheless been marginalized by the early Church, such as asceticism, mysticism, the formation of closed holy communities, the return to Scripture, and eschatological beliefs (Foucault, 2007a: 204-15). These were ‘movements whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to say: wanting to be conducted differently, by other conducteurs and other shepherds, towards other objectives and forms of salvation, and through other procedures and methods’ (ibid: 194-5). Rather than, in Rose’s terminology, looking ‘beyond government’ (1999: 281), a counter-conducts approach looks within government to see how forms of resistance rely upon, and are even implicated within, the strategies, techniques and power relationships they oppose. As Foucault makes clear, ‘the history of the governmental ratio, and the history of the counter-conducts opposed to it, are inseparable from each other’ (2007a: 357).  
	It is in this way that a Foucauldian perspective can usefully supplement and challenge existing approaches to social movements and protests. A counter-conducts approach focuses on practices and mentalities of resistance, rather than movements, and also seeks to show how power and resistance, government and dissent, are mutually constitutive. The form protests take are closely linked to the regimes of power against which they are opposed – and simultaneously practices of government themselves are shaped by manner in which they are resisted.
	
An analytics of protest
In order to show how the idea of counter-conducts can be translated into a framework for analysing protests, Mitchell Dean’s ‘analytics of government’ approach is drawn upon (1999: 20). Dean draws attention to four dimensions of government: the fields of visibility it creates and the ends to which it aims; the forms of knowledge it relies upon; the particular technologies and apparatuses it mobilizes; and the subjectivities or identities it produces. These categories can also be applied to the study of protests.
First, ‘to govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised’, and to conceptualize the ends of government (Rose, 1999: 36). The same can be said for counter-conducts, as protests make visible particular vistas or discursive horizons, and obscure others. Protest can be directed against the policies of a particular state or organization, a social group or even an individual, or against a system or set of values – as well as being performed for the benefit of various potential audiences ranging from the state, the media, supporters, fellow activists, the international community, or even individual consciences. Many protests are explicitly transnational, global, or what Roland Bleiker describes as transversal, which ‘not only transgresses national boundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct of international relations’ (2000: 2). The appeal of ecological protestors to trans-generational and trans-species perspectives can be similarly read as a disruption of conventional state-centric, humanist, temporally-limited forms of politics. 
Secondly, protests, just as much as regimes of government, presume or reify certain regimes of knowledge. Analysis of these veridical discourses involves asking ‘what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation, or rationality are employed’, and which are marginalized or excluded (Dean, 1999: 31). Whereas the rise of the state has been intimately associated with the development of statistics – literally the ‘science of the state’ (Foucault, 2007a: 101 & 274) – protestors have often invoked alternative, subaltern or marginalized forms of knowledge. Others, as Barry shows, have prided themselves on the ‘scientificity’ of their claims (2001: 167). These forms of rationality need to be systematically critiqued, as Foucault urges: ‘those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to denounce violence or criticize an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in general. What has to be questioned is the form of rationality at stake’ (2000a: 324).
Thirdly, protests and contentious forms of politics invoke particular practices, techniques, and technologies: the mass march, the placard, the podium speaker, the emblazoned t-shirt, mask or costume, the barricade, and so on. Political clashes and counter-conducts are not simply a battle of ideologies or worldviews, but involve wars of position and movement between particular forms of action. Repertoires of protest are clearly invented, inherited, and learnt (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 181-5; Tarrow, 1998: 21). However, they are also produced and shaped by forms of government they confront. Tax returns, registers of property, electoral rolls, and censuses are confronted by civil disobedience campaigns, songs, street theatre and banners; and technologies such as hospitals, schools, prisons, and social welfare schemes are mirrored and subverted by climate camps, teach-ins, and hunger strikes. Theatrical forms of protest – the carnival and the circus – have often been adopted by activists and the media, and contrast markedly with the seriousness of state realpolitik (O’Neill, 2004; St John, 2008).
	Finally, just as government operates through ‘technologies of the self’ (Lemke, 2001: 201) to create governable subjects, such as the liberal citizen, the infirm, the delinquent, the poor, the dangerous and the terrorist (Foucault, 1998; 2007a), counter-conducts subvert and re-invent these categories. An analytics of protest asks: what forms of person, self, and identity are presupposed by different forms of counter-conduct, and how do protests bring new identities and subjectivities into being? Familiar categories such as the working class, the poor, the nation, cosmopolitan citizens, anarchist individuals, and the postmodern multitude have all been imagined and performed at least in part through marching, dissenting, demonstrating, and resisting together (Casquete, 2006; Kulynych, 1997: 331) – and protests have often acted as transgressive and carnivalesque spaces in which normal social identities and codes of conduct are inverted and subverted. Yet protests have their own discursive norms of behaviour – of conduct – such as humility, imagination, patriotism, ecological sustainability, or revolutionary fervour, and employ ‘techniques of responsibilization’ (Rose, 1999: 74) in a similar way to regimes of advanced liberal government. 

Analysing summit protests
This analytics of protest can be used as a framework to examine and compare moments of contentious politics, and to show how they both resist and reinforce regimes of power and government. Protests at major world summits are a useful illustration of an analytics of protest in practice, since they are increasingly visible manifestations of dissent (Della Porta et al, 2006: 9; St John, 2008: 168). They also differ from Barry’s analysis in that they are explicitly sited at what is constructed as the heart of political power, rather than its point of implementation, thus highlighting even more directly the relationship between sovereign power, governmental rationalities, and resistance. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive or comparative analysis of the summit protests – but merely to illustrate what an analytics of protest approach might illuminate.

i) Fields of visibility
	International summits claim to establish a panoramic and far-reaching view of global politics. The summit metaphor is no accident, and as Costas Constantinou explains, it ‘fosters conventional ways of ordering the world, celebrates hierarchy and works to shape the global imaginary by recollecting popular stories or images of mountaineering, of high or noble objective, or control, of progress, of fortitude, and of human mastery fields of vision’ (1998: 24). It was claimed in Johannesburg in 2002 that UN conferences since Rio had ‘defined for the world a comprehensive vision for the future of humanity’ (UN, 2002: #9). In advance of the G20 meeting in London in March 2009, the BBC reported that ‘sherpas have slogged through the foothills, established base camp and marked out a route to the mountain top. It is now down to the G20 leaders to make the final push and, ideally, stand together in agreement on the summit’ (Pym, 2009). Such invocations of verticality and hierarchy imply that summits offer higher perspectives, and greater objectivity, rising above day-to-day political divisions.
	In contrast, protests at summits have disrupted these assertions by revealing how dominant discourses reproduce partial and inherently political fields of vision. Thus, protests and counter-summits in Rio, Seattle, Johannesburg and elsewhere have sought to bring ‘international summits out of the shadowy world of reserved agreements between diplomats and technocrats and into the media spotlight’ (Della Porta et al, 2006: 9). In Johannesburg in 2002, at least 20,000 protestors marched from the deprived environs of Alexandra Township to the conference centre in the northern suburbs. The route was chosen to highlight the appalling conditions in which many South Africans still live, and to emphasize the difference between these conditions and the wealthy environs of Sandton where Summit delegates spent most of their time. March organizers from the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) contrasted the ‘environmental degradation, and generalized poverty that is present-day Alexandra’ with the ‘hideous wealth and extravagance of Sandton where the W$$D is taking place’ (SMI, 2002). Claims by delegates to represent the global interest were contested by protestors who argued that the ‘fat cat bureaucrats and politicians’ in Sandton did not represent them (SMI, 2002). They asserted their own, more global scales of visibility, illustrating the ways in which, as Barry argues, ‘political demonstration [is] an exercise in publicity’ (2001: 191). As such, the logic of attempting to hold a global summit was not contested at the protests; rather it was the specific viewpoints promoted at the Summit which were resisted. 
	This is typical of ways in which counter-summits ‘exploit the window of visibility offered by summits’ (Della Porta et al, 2006: 147), and thus both disrupt and reinforce diplomatic discourses of verticality and superiority of vision. Protesting at summits can therefore paradoxically confirm their privileged location and viewpoint: they reinforce the impression that this is where power is located. Chatterjee and Finger identified this in their analysis of protests against the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, arguing that protestors in Brazil ‘became caught in what could be called the “UNCED visibility trap” ’, where whatever their campaign, they all worked to ‘increase the visibility of the UNCED process’ (1994: 90). This ambiguous relationship between summitry and protest, with their shared fields of vision but contrasting perspectives, illustrates how forms of resistance and government can be simultaneously mutually constitutive as well as antagonistic.

ii) Regimes of knowledge 
Protests invoke particular regimes of truth and knowledge. Summit counter-conducts often negotiate a delicate balance between challenging the basis of scientific knowledge, for example, and using that knowledge tactically in order to force action on certain issues. Foucault noted how the ‘so-called ecological movement’ in the 1970s had often been opposed

to a science or, at least, to a technology underwritten by claims to truth. But this same ecology articulated its own discourse of truth: criticism was authorized in the name of a knowledge of nature, the balance of life processes, and so on. Thus, one escaped from a domination of truth not by playing a game that was totally different from the game of truth but by playing the same game differently, or playing another game, another hand, with other trump cards (1997: 295).

Some summit protests aim to pressure governments to fulfil their responsibilities and govern markets, international institutions or the environment more intensely, often invoking scientific discourses and arguments (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 133-135; O’Brien et al, 2000: 41 & 114). Other take to the streets rejecting proposals for legal treaties, targets, timeframes and partnerships, and resisting instrumental and technocratic discourses in favour of more emotive or creative appeals (Donson et al, 2004; O’Neill, 2004; Munnik and Wilson, 2003). 
Climate change camps have become a familiar part of summit protests, seen in both London and Copenhagen during 2009. Such protests frequently demand that governments pay more attention to the warnings of climate scientists and take greater action on regulating carbon emissions. Yet climate protestors also invoke more holistic, eco-centric and spiritual forms of knowledge, communicated in emotive and theatrical ways (O’Neill, 2004; Wapner, 1995). Similarly, campaigns against nuclear power have simultaneously invoked scientific knowledge and discourses, whilst contesting scientifically induced hazards (Death, 2006). This leads to what Ulrich Beck describes as a ‘Kafkaesque experience of protest’, akin to arm-wrestling oneself (1995: 60). By shifting debates into the register of aesthetic, emotive or moral truths, protestors can subvert dominant regimes of expert knowledge; yet escaping modernist, Enlightenment discourses of knowledge and rationality is never completely possible – nor perhaps always desirable.
	
iii) Techniques and technologies
Closely related to the regimes of knowledge invoked are the tactics and techniques adopted during protests. Della Porta and Diani identify three logics of protest – numbers, damage, and bearing witness (2006: 171-178) – and these provide a useful starting point for analysing the means, techniques, and techne of protest. A counter-conducts perspective emphasizes, moreover, how these techniques are related to, and implicated in, the forms of power to which they are opposed; this is one of the key contributions that a governmentality framework can make to the study of protest, an aspect somewhat neglected even by Barry (2001). As Amoore and Langley point out in the course of making a rather different argument, ‘trade unions, universities, the media, and church organizations are all historical sites of civil society uprising, but they are simultaneously spaces of representation, exclusion and control’ (2004: 105). 
The mass march is an enduring technique of protest. The legitimacy, constituency and mandate that tens or hundreds of thousands of people on the street can convey is a hotly contested resource – such as during the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 when the official civil society march led by the ANC numbered less than 5,000, whilst the more confrontational social movements mobilized over four times as many (Munnik and Wilson, 2003: 3). For a political party which still sees itself as a grassroots, mass-mobilized organization, the defeat on the streets was humiliating, and activists claimed triumphantly that ‘on 31 August 2002 the map of the South African political landscape was fundamentally transformed’ (Appolis, 2002: 7). Yet this was less a challenge to established models of politics than a demand to be heard and included: the logic of numbers also underpins democratic politics through elections, straw polls and referendums, and populist parties like the ANC and their trade union allies have built their reputations and struggles through putting bodies on the street.
Secondly, the logic of damage relies upon direct attacks on the property, symbols, or even bodies of the protest targets. Violence can be both an end in itself (obstruction of delegates entering the WTO meeting in Seattle, for example) and a publicity tactic which ‘attracts far more media attention than nonviolence does’ (Bleiker, 2002: 204). As Bleiker points out in the context of the Seattle protests, ‘a Molotov cocktail or a street fight between protesters and police offers far more spectacular and attractive “news” material than does a peaceful protest march’ (204), although on the other hand, this attention has its price. Moreover, rather than transforming the nature of politics, violent counter-conducts adopt and invoke the tactics of government. States are of course no stranger to the logic of damage, and in such struggles the odds are stacked against protestors, not only in terms of coercive power, but also in the way that the threat of violence and the response of state repression work to legitimate and reaffirm the raison d’etre of the Hobbesian state. Sovereign and authoritarian forms of power have not been abandoned within governmental rationalities of rule (Dean, 1999: 134-135), but rather inserted within the ‘triangle’ of modern government: ‘sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism’ (Foucault, 2007a: 107-108).
	Thirdly, the tactic of ‘bearing witness’ is where protestors seek ‘to demonstrate a strong commitment to an objective deemed vital for humanity’s future’ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 176). Hunger strikes, sit-ins, civil disobedience, candlelit vigils and banner-hanging are all classic examples of bearing witness, as is the street theatre of recent protests (Wapner, 1995). In Seattle in 1999, for example, activists dressed as turtles roamed the crowds, trying to ensure the protests remained non-violent (Della Porta et al, 2006: 2), and the media pointedly contrasted the black-suited police with the ‘mix of Monarch butterflies, giant tomatoes, and bare-breasted women in the parades’ (O’Neill, 2004: 240). As with the logics of numbers and damage however, such appeals to morality or the public good are familiar techniques of rule for various rationalities of government from crude populism to liberal democracy.
	These logics do not exhaust the techniques of protest, but merely provide one way to illustrate some of the specific practices involved in summit protests and the logics on which they rest. They also show how counter-conducts both subvert and invert techniques of government. The re-appropriation of familiar tactics is a central feature of the way counter-conducts both reinforce and destabilize prevailing practices of government.

iv) Political identities and subjectivities
	The tactics and techniques mobilized are not merely instrumental. Through the act of protest and demonstrating, new identities and subjectivities are performatively constituted (Casquete, 2006), and protest is itself a very powerful site ‘through which the self is constructed or modified by himself’ (Foucault, quoted in Lemke, 2001: 204). High-profile protests can have a foundational, constitutive importance for the mythology of movements, as references to the Seattle movement, or the movement of 31 August in South Africa imply. Elias Canetti famously described this, observing that the attraction of a crowd lies 

in that density, where there is scarcely any space between, and body presses against body, each man is as near the other as he is to himself; and an immense feeling of relief ensues. It is for the sake of this blessed moment, when no one is greater or better than another, that people become a crowd (1973: 19).

In the aftermath of Seattle, for example, enthusiastic commentators proclaimed that ‘global public opinion’ had emerged as a new superpower to rival the USA (quoted in Hardt and Negri, 2004: 258). In 2002 many saw the fundamental objective of the Johannesburg march as being to draw the political lines in South Africa more clearly, and building ‘the “base” of a movement that could in the long term challenge the ANC at the polls’ (Misbach, 2002). Similar claims were made in London and Copenhagen in 2009. Yet, as Canetti observed, this moment is transitory and rarely lasts. Often the political subjectivities performed through protests are exaggerated or momentary. This is not to claim, however, that they are unimportant or insignificant.
Moreover, for the duration of the summit identities can be starkly polarized and often confrontational. In 2002 radical protestors accused the South African state of being ‘the local and continental agent of imperialism’ (Appolis, 2002: 10), and there were calls to shut down the Summit, blockade motorways and ‘take Sandton’ (Misbach, 2002). Authoritarian state policing of summits exacerbates this antagonism, and ANC policing tactics in 2002 reminded many of Apartheid-era repression (Duguid, 2002), whilst the apparent brutality of the police – resulting in the death of an innocent bystander – during the 2009 G20 Summit in London was widely criticized (Monbiot, 2009), as was the Danish policing of Copenhagen (BBC, 2009). The vigorous assertion of sovereign power has been a general feature of summit policing, where ‘the risk of real threats to the lives of foreign governors is combined with the symbolic need for the host government to appear, in the eyes of international public opinion, to be able to assert the monopoly of force in its own territory as corollary to its own sovereignty’ (Della Porta et al, 2006: 138). This has led to an increased police and military presence at protests, the use of collective containment tactics (known as kettling in the UK), water cannons, tear gas, baton charges and rubber bullets. Della Porta et al note that

the fortification of the summit sites produces effects that tend to be dangerous; concentrating police efforts of defending it greatly restricts the kinds of protest that can be peaceful but visible and increases the distance between the rulers and the population (2006: 167).

Protestors have adroitly manipulated such polarization – and actively invoked outlaw or folk hero stereotypes – as in the Prague protests against the IMF and World Bank in 2001. Donson et al show how ‘the confrontation between the white overalls of Ya Basta! and the black riot uniforms of the police conjured up the classic binary opposition of black/white that has symbolically denotes good and evil’ (Donson et al, 2004: 22). Movement identities and solidarities are forged even, or perhaps especially, through violent confrontations (Casquete, 2006).
	The constitutive effects of protests are not merely confined to social movements; protests are also formative moments for state institutions (St John, 2008: 183). O’Neill draws attention to how ‘countries are increasingly attempting to coordinate strategies and share information about transnational activists’, and this has led to ‘increased interstate cooperation around public order practices and surveillance and monitoring between protests’ (2004: 245). During the G20 protests in London, the Metropolitan police described their policing plan as ‘one of the largest, most challenging and complicated public order operations it has ever devised’, involving 84,000 police man-hours, the co-operation of six police forces, and a £7.5m security plan (Casciani, 2009). Boyle and Haggerty argue that this sort of summit policing works to ‘foster the production and circulation of sophisticated and specialized security knowledges’ (2009: 267), and that ‘proliferating security routines characteristic of mega-events fosters a security-infused pedagogy of acceptable comportment, dress and documentation, as small lessons in security are inflated and played out before a global audience’ (ibid: 270). The vital importance of urban architectures to both police and protestors in the government and contestation of summitry is one way of bringing the neglected dimensions of territoriality and spatiality back into the governmentality literature (Elden, 2007: 32).
These highly contested summit protests have tended to both reinforce coercive state practices, as well as forging transnational and public-private linkages. Rather than social movement activism eroding the power of the state (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 36; Taylor, 1995: 1), states are instead being reshaped through the policing of global summit protests. Protests therefore have the effect of reifying both states and their critics in the polarized atmosphere of the summit. 
	As Canetti implied however, this apparently stark clash between states and protestors at the summit is not as profound, or as long-lasting, as it appears at the time. The temporary clash between policeman and protestor does not exhaust the complex and polycentric ways in which rule is exercised in contemporary global politics. Many of those who marched in Johannesburg in 2002, for example, had their roots in organizations linked or allied to the ANC (Bond and Desai, 2008). Many of those protesting in Denmark in 2009 would have been negotiating or lobbying inside had the capacity of the venue been greater (BBC, 2009). Rather than a binary conflict between North and South, or the governed against the governors, many of those who participate within, and protest against, global summits are bound together in rhizome networks of global governmentality.
	If this is the case, and protests/counter-conducts do not represent the drawing up of new lines of conflict between the governed and the governors, then what is their functional role in contemporary politics? A provocative answer is provided by Ingolfur Blühdorn, who suggests that protest events at summits post-Seattle fulfil an essentially expressive function, and that

the significance of social movement politics lies not so much in the demonstration of protest and opposition for the purpose of political change, but in the demonstration, performance and experience of something that is desperately needed in the late-modern condition but that has no place in the established socio-economic system: autonomy, identity, and agency (2006: 36).

Whereas, he clarifies, it would be demonstrably false to claim that protestors aim to stabilize the status quo, he does suggest that ‘social movements do indeed have a system-stabilizing effect in that they reassert the autonomy and agency of the Self vis-à-vis the system’ (37). Such an assessment echoes at least part of my argument: which is that such acts of protest can both challenge and reinforce hegemonic power relations, at the same time. Indeed, it is in the very appearance of challenging power relations, of claiming agency and demonstrating – literally to demonstrate, to make evident (Barry, 2001: 178) – that such protests can provide reassurance, a semblance of control and agency, and thereby re-legitimize established (often liberal democratic) forms of politics.
	 
An ethics of continual criticism
The analytics of protest set out here is therefore focussed on mapping the relationship between rationalities of protest, and mentalities of government. Rather than assuming protests represent out-and-out resistance to power, a counter-conducts approach shows how they bring new visibilities, knowledges, techniques and identities into being, whilst reinforcing existing practices and mentalities of government. As such this approach aims to analyse, diagnose and critique rationalities and practices of protest, and it is not primarily normative or prescriptive, in terms of advocating specific forms of dissent. Yet it might be read as being somewhat negative or pessimistic about the point or function of protest. This is not my aim, and this final section locates the analytics of protest in terms of an ethos of continual criticism and politicization (Foucault, 2000b: 457).
Foucault believed that ‘the work of a deep transformation can be done in the open and always turbulent atmosphere of a continual criticism’ (2000b: 457). For Dean, ‘an analytics of government attempts to show that our taken-for-granted ways of doing things and how we think about and question them are not entirely self-evident or necessary’ (1999: 21). This stance is directly applicable to an analytics of protest, which tasks itself with ‘making conflicts more visible, or making them more essential than mere clashes of interest or mere institutional blockages’ (Foucault, 2000b: 457), and emphasizing the conflictual and contestable dimensions of modern government. 
	Protests, or counter-conducts, are themselves forms of continual criticism and politicization. Although they may never represent ‘pure’ resistance, they are still important for a vibrant and radical democratic politics. Indeed, hoping or searching for an impossibly pure resistance is probably more politically debilitating than Foucault’s hyper and pessimistic activism. Counter-conducts are political acts, in that for Foucault, ‘politics is no more or less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the first uprising, the first confrontation’ (2007a: 390). For Barry, ‘an action is political … to the degree to which it opens up new sites and objects of contestation. And it is anti-political to the extent that is closes down the space of contestation’ (2001: 194). Therefore, drawing attention to relationships of power and resistance, regimes of government and counter-conducts is itself part of ‘an ethic of permanent resistance’ (Simons, 1995: 87), and is inherently political. 
	Such an attitude is not sufficient for a comprehensive analysis of social movements, nor does it provide a prescription for a radically democratic or progressive politics. Approaches which analyse the motivations, successes, linkages and mobilizations of specific movements are of great value; just as are considerations of the democratic norms of deliberation, compromise and consensus. However, an ethic of permanent resistance and continual criticism, and an orientation to the destabilizing and creative potential of counter-conducts is, I argue, a necessary and currently under-emphasized dimension of both social movement studies and radically democratic politics. 

Conclusion
	A counter-conducts approach has much to offer the study of protest and resistance. It is not an attempt to undermine the actual struggles of activists and movements, nor is it a rejection of political engagement and struggle. In fact, it aims at the opposite: the introduction of a serious focus upon dissent and protest into the governmentality literature. Theorists of governmentality have argued that ‘the political vocabulary structured by oppositions between state and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy, and the like, does not adequately characterize the diverse ways in which rule is exercised in advanced liberal democracies’ (Rose and Miller, 2008: 53). It is through pursuing the implications of the Foucauldian de-stabilizing of these oppositions, that an analytics of protest can be most useful.
	I have argued that Foucault’s conceptualization of resistance as an integral and inseparable element of modern regimes of power and government, and his descriptions of counter-conducts as ‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price’ (Foucault, 2007b: 75), enables a new orientation in the study of social movements, dissent and protest. An analytics of protest, focusing on the visibilities established, knowledges invoked, techniques adopted and identities produced, provides new theoretical tools for analysing protests and their relationship to global power relations and governmentalities. The major advantages of such an approach are twofold. By focusing on practices and mentalities, rather than actors, it shows how moments of protest bring new identities, subjectivities, and collectivities into being – including civic, movement, state, and governmental actors. Secondly, by destabilizing binaries including power and resistance, government and freedom, national and international, and public and private, such an approach enables a more complex and nuanced analysis of the overlapping, multi-centric, variegated, and rhizomatic networks of global power relations. Such an approach can reveal much about, for example, the ways in which summit protests such as in Seattle, Johannesburg, Prague, London and Copenhagen both subvert and simultaneously reinforce structures of global governance. Conceiving protest in these terms militates against searching for a pure form of revolutionary resistance, or outright condemnation of the apparent collaborator. As Foucault made clear, 

	we need to escape the dilemma of being either for or against. One can, after all, be face to face, and upright [debout et en face]. Working with a government doesn’t imply either a subjection or a blanket acceptance. One can work with and be intransigent at the same time. I would even say that the two things go together (2000b: 455-6).

A critically important task is therefore to interrogate the degree to which acts of resistance destabilize or reinforce existing power relations, and ultimately ‘to enhance the contestability of regimes of authority that seek to govern us in the name of our own good’ (Rose, 1999: 60).
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